COMMENTS
The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact
Liability Under Title VII
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., I the Supreme Court expanded the
scope of possible liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19642 by holding that employment practices that have a disparate
impact on a protected class, although not discriminatory on their
face, are unlawful unless justified by "business necessity."' 3 The
Griggs Court did not, however, discuss the scope of the business
1 401

U.S. 424 (1971).
Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 352 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e15 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Title VII]. The Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
401 U.S. at 431. Title VII prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin as well as disparate impact caused by an employment
practice such as that in Griggs. An employer need not be acting out of personal animosity
toward a protected class to be guilty of intentional discrimination; it is only necessary that,
for whatever reasons, he is using a racial or other prohibited criterion. See, e.g., Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d
385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). But see International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) ("Proof of discrminatory motive is critical").
See also Fiss, A Theory of FairEmployment Laws, 38 U. CHi. L. Rav. 235, 298-99 (1971).
A narrow exception to this broad ban does exist. Employers may discriminate on the
basis of religion, sex, or national origin where the criteria are "bona fide occupational
qualification[s]." Title VII, § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). See generally B. ScHLm
& P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMErNT DISCRIMINATION LAw 278-92 (1976).
The Act also requires an employer to make reasonable accommodations to an employee's
religious observances or practices. This requirement originated in the 1966 EEOC Guidelines
on Discrimination Because of Religion, 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966) (current version at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1605.1(b) (1978)). Although the requirement was originally thrown in doubt by the courts,
see, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd mem. by an equally
divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971), it was ratified by Congress in 1972. Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j) (1976)). See generally TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); B. SCHLEI& P. GRossMAN, supra, at 185-219.
2
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necessity defense.4 Consequently, lower courts have been afforded a
considerable degree of freedom in shaping the contours of the defense. Although the Supreme Court applied the doctrine rather liberally in one recent case, 5 most courts have construed the defense
narrowly;' many of them have adopted a "balancing" approach, 7 in
which the disparate impact of an employer's practice is balanced
against the benefits of the practice.
The strict application of the business necessity defense has
meant that many legitimate profit-maximizing business practices
have triggered Title VII liability. Title VII has thus imposed additional costs on employers by preventing the use of efficient business
practices whenever the benefits derived from the practices do not
outweigh their adverse impact on a protected class. This subordination of profit-maximizing practices to the goal of enhancing minority employment has been called unsound as a matter of social polSee 401 U.S. at 431. For the Court to have set forth the scope would have been dictum
in any event since the employer conceded that he adopted the standards in question "without
meaningful study of their relationship to job-performance ability." Id.
5 New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 99 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 n.31 (1979), discussed in
text at notes 42-44 infra.
I See, e.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1377 (9th Cir. 1979) (defense is
"very narrow"); Green v. Missouri Pac. RR., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975) (business
necessity "'connotes an irresistible demand' "); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,
451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971) (same), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (same). See also Note, Business
Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-AlternativeApproach, 84 YAu
L.J. 98, 101-02 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note].
7 See, e.g., Townsend v. Nassau County Medical Center, 558 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); Rodriguez v. East Tex, Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 56-57
(5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,'419 U.S. 1122 (1975); United States v. N.L.
Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 365-6b (8th Cir. 1973); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d
216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972); B. Scmai & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 143-47; Note,
Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation:A Uniform Standard
for Both Public and PrivateEmployers, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 505, 521-22 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation];Note,
Fair Employment Practices: The Concept of Business Necessity, 3 MEM. ST. U.L. Rxv. 76,
83, 88-91 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Fair Employment Practices]; Note, Facially
Neutral Criteriaand DiscriminationUnder Title V "Built-in Headwinds" or Permissible
Practices?, 6 U. MIcH. J.L. REP. 97, 109 n.71 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Facially
Neutral Criteriaand DiscriminationUnder Title VII]; Yale Note, supra note 6, at 101 & n.18;
6 GA. L. REv. 194, 201 (1971); Annot., 36 A.L.R. Fed. 9, 25-29 (1978). The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission has incorporated a balancing test in its own regulations. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.5(c)(2)(iii) (1978). The Ninth Circuit seems to have suggested a balancing standard.
See Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1378 (9th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Pike Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971). Johnson has been widely criticized. See Wilson, A Second
Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination,and
the Role of the FederalCourts, 58 VA. L. REv. 844, 850-51 (1972); 85 HAxv. L. Rav. 1482 (1972).
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icy.8 Still, many have argued that a restrictive application of the
business necessity defense is faithful to Congress's intent in enacting Title VII.
This comment argues, however, that a proper determination of
the scope of the business necessity defense should turn on what
concept of equality underlies the disparate-impact liability of
Griggs-equal,color-blind'0 treatment of individuals, or equal social
and economic achievement for protected classes. Specifically, the
comment maintains that although an equal-achievement theory of
Title VII can easily be reconciled with the courts' narrow construction of the defense, an equal-treatment rationale necessarily implies
that the defense should protect almost all profit-maximizing employment practices. After an analysis of the legislative history and
judicial development of Title VII, the comment concludes that the
statute's goal is the equal treatment of individuals, not equal
achievement for protected classes, and that consequently, the business necessity defense has been applied too restrictively.

I. THE Griggs DECISION
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. was a class action alleging that Duke
Power Company was violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 by requiring a high school diploma and satisfactory aptitude
test scores as conditions of employment in its upper-level jobs."
Duke Power was divided into five operating departments; before
1965, blacks were hired only in the labor department, where the
highest-paying job paid less than the lowest-paying job in any of
the other four departments. Since 1955 Duke Power had required
' See generally Fiss, supra note 3, at 257; Tobin, On Improving the Economic Status of
the Negro, 94 DAEDALUS 878 (1965). See also Landes, The Economics of Fair Employment
Laws, 76 J. PoL. ECON. 507, 508-13, 545-48 (1968).
1 E.g., Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. Rev. 59 (1972); Jain & Ledvinka, Economic
Inequality and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,26 LAB. L.J. 579, 579 (1975)
("economic inequality was what Congress set out to attack with [Title VII]"); Note, Fair
Employment Practices,supra note 7.
WFor the sake of textual simplicity, this comment will frequently speak only of discrimination against blacks. Title VII is, of course, not limited to racial discrimination; it also covers
discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin. There are some distinctions in
the legal treatment of different bases of discrimination. For example, racial discrimination
is not subject to the exception for "bona fide occupational qualification," see note 3 supra.
For the most part, however, the different bases of discrimination are analytically interchangeable-what is said of racial discrimination applies equally well to its cognates-and
the analysis of this comment applies to Title VII discrimination generally.
" The plaintiffs also contended that Duke Power had discriminated in its allocation of
overtime. See note 16 infra.
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a high school education for initial employment in all departments
except labor, and for interdepartmental transfers into the three
most preferred departments. In 1965, Duke Power dropped its
racial restrictions on hiring, but required all applicants for nonlabor
jobs to pass two professionally prepared aptitude tests.1 2
The hiring criteria-aptitude tests and high school diplomaoperated to exclude blacks proportionately more than whites, 3
and showed no "demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which . . . [they were] used."' 4 There was
no indication, however, that the requirements had been instituted
with a discriminatory motive. 5
Duke Power's black employees, suing for themselves and for a
class including future black employees, challenged the education
and testing requirements, contending that the criteria operated to
perpetuate the effects of past discriminatory practices. 6 And specifically with respect to the permissibility of the tests, the plaintiffs
relied 7 on an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) decision" interpreting section 703(h) of Title VII as re2 This change went into effect on July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427 (1971). Two months later, Duke Power agreed to allow
previously hired personnel to apply for interdepartmental transfers with either a high school
diploma or a passing grade on the two tests. Id. at 427-28.
'3 Whites had a significantly higher pass rate on the tests than blacks, and completion
of high school was far more prevalent among whites than blacks. See Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1239 n.6 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Both of these tendencies were considered to be directly traceable to the inferior education afforded blacks in North
Carolina's segregated schools. Id.
1 401 U.S. at 431.
IS Id. at 432.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1229 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424
(1971). The plaintiffs argued that Duke Power discriminated in three different ways: (1)
placement of the plaintiffs "in the low paying labor department and. . .[denial of] access
to the more desirable departments as a result of the defendant's discriminatory hiring and
promotional policies," Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); (2) "allowing
passing marks on two general intelligence tests to substitute for a high school education in
determining eligibility for departmental transfer," id. at 249; and (3) "allocation of overtime
work at its Dan River Station," id. at 250.
11See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1233-34 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S.
424 (1971).
"1 Decision of EEOC (Dec. 2, 1966) (published in EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH)
17,304.53)
(cited by the Fourth Circuit, 420 F.2d at 1223, and by the Supreme Court, 401 U.S. at 430
n.6).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The section provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice . . .for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any
professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action
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quiring that any standardized tests be shown to be job related.
The district court dismissed the complaint. 20 It held that Title
VII has no retroactive force and thus provides no remedy for discrimination occurring before 1965.21 The court also rejected the
EEOC's interpretation of section 703(h), holding that the Act does
not "require that employers . . . utilize only those tests which

accurately measure the ability and skills required of a particular
job or group of jobs." Moreover, according to the court, the high
school education requirement did not violate Title VII since it had
"a legitimate business purpose and [was] equally applicable to
3
both Negro and white employees similarly situated."
The Fourth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Boreman, reversed
the lower court decision in part.24 The court concluded that Title VII
does allow the courts to remedy prospectively the present effects of
prior discrimination,2 but agreed with the trial court that neither
a specific
section 703(h) nor Title VII required Duke Power to show
26
relation between its hiring criteria and particular jobs.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 27 on the question
whether Title VII prohibits facially neutral employment criteria
that exclude a disproportionately high number of blacks when
those criteria are not "shown to be significantly related to successful job performance. ' 2 8 In reversing the lower court rulings, the
Court established a new rule of Title VII liability. The Court held
that Title VII reaches not only intentional discrimination, but also
employment practices that are neutral on their face and in their
intent, yet which have the effect of excluding minority applicants-',
The Act, the Court held, forbids "practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity.
If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes canupon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.
28 292 F. Supp. at 252.
21 Id. at 247.
2 Id. at 250.
z Id. at 251.

2* 420 F.2d at 1237.
2 Id. at 1230-31. On this ground, the court held that the testing and high school diploma
requirements could not be applied to six plaintiff-employees hired before 1955. When they
were hired, there was no diploma or testing requirement; hence, they had been limited to the
labor department solely because of Duke Power's racial restrictions.
2s Id. at 1234-35. Judge Sobeloff dissented from this position of the majority. Id. at 123944 (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
2 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 399 U.S. 926 (1970).
25 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971).

" Id. at 430-32.
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not be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. ' 3 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stressed that
Congress, in enacting Title VII, was concerned with "the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation," 31 and that the employer had the burden of showing that its
hiring criteria were related to the specific jobs to which those criteria
2
applied.
The Court held that Duke Power's testing and education requirements violated Title VII, since Duke Power had not contended
that the criteria were related to the demands of any particular job
or class of jobs, and since it had failed to show that the. criteria
helped to assure that entering employees would later be qualified
for advancement to higher levels under Duke Power's promotion
system. 33 Chief Justice Burger went on to reject Duke Power's
argument that section 703(h) made lawful the use of its professionally developed tests; Congress, the Chief Justice concluded,
34
meant to protect only job-related tests.
The Court's holding and its very general statements concerning
the business necessity defense left open at least three critical questions regarding the defense. First, the Court did not identify what
sorts of business purposes should justify an employer's practices
under the business necessity defense. This issue was settled easily
in subsequent lower court cases. The typical formulation of the rule
is that a legitimate business purpose is one essential to the safe and
efficient operation of the business. 5 Hence, conformity with industry practice or the preservation of the status quo, for example, are
not sufficient justifications.36 Lower courts have also held that an
employer may not use otherwise illegal practices to accommodate
3oId. at 431.
31Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
32

Id.

13Id. at 431-32. The Court thus left open the question whether an entry-level criterion
may properly test for capacity for future in-house promotion. Id. at 432.
11Id. at 433-36.
3 E.g., Rock v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 473 F.2d 1344, 1349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
933 (1973); United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc),

cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662
(2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971). But see Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
3' Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798-99 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971); United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 235 (N.D. Ill. 1976), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
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discriminatory preferences of consumers 3 or workers. 8
Second, the Court did not address what the quantum and nature of proof should be for showing the nexus between the employer's business purpose and the means employed for achieving
that purpose. The result has been a series of complicated Supreme
Court decisions focusing largely on the problems concerning the
validation of testing requirements. The problem has not been entirely resolved, but an analysis of the Court's attempts to resolve it
39
is beyond the scope of this comment.
Finally, the Court did not discuss how "necessary" the business
purpose must be in order to establish the defense. One possible
interpretation involves requiring an employer to show only that the
practice serves a legitimate business purpose. Another possibility is
that the Court intended a balancing test comparing the benefit to
the employer with the adverse impact on minority applicants. How
the defense is to be applied depends on whether, and to what extent,
Title VII was intended to impose positive costs on employers who
are innocent of intentional discrimination." If a legitimate business
purpose is in itself a complete defense, then no employer would be
required to incur any substantial expense to comply with Title VII.
The Act would then merely operate to prevent employers from using
devices that discriminate (intentionally or not) against minorities
and that serve no legitimate function. By contrast, if the defense
involves a balancing test, then an employer may sometimes be
found liable under Title VII for using an employment practice that
fosters a legitimate purpose in the operation of his business. Under
this approach, Title VII would force the employer to absorb a
cost-what he would have saved by using the prohibited practice-and thus prevent him from behaving as a rational, profitmaximizing businessman.

1 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971). See also EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §
1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1978).
31Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
, See generally Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Implicationsfor Privateand
Public Employers, 50 TEx. L. REv. 901 (1972); Shoben, Probing the DiscriminatoryEffects
of Employee Selection Procedureswith DisparateImpact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx.
L. Rav. 1 (1977); Wilson, supranote 7; Note, Applicationof the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation, supra note 7; Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HAV. L. REv. 387 (1975); Note,
Employment Discrimination:Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 VA. L. Rlv. 463
(1973).
" See Yale Note, supra note 6, at 99, 102.
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IX. SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS NECESSITY
DEFENSE

The federal district courts and courts of appeals have almost
uniformly held that the business necessity defense of Griggs is not
satisfied simply by a showing that an employment practice serves
a legitimate business purpose." Their holdings may, however, be in
conflict with the Supreme Court's construction of the defense in
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer.4 2 In Beazer, the New
York City Transit Authority refused to hire methadone users for any
position. The plaintiffs, alleging that the defendant's exclusion had
a disparate impact on blacks and Hispanics, conceded that goals of
safety and efficiency required the exclusion of all methadone users
from "safety sensitive" jobs, and of a majority of users from all
jobs.43 "[T]hose goals," the Court said, "are significantly served
by-even if they do not require-[the defendant's] rule as it applies to all methadone users including those who are seeking employment in nonsafety sensitive positions. . . . The record thus
demonstrates that [the defendant's] rule bears a 'manifest relationship to the employment in question,' " as required by Griggs.
Thus, the Court held that, even assuming the plaintiffs' statistics
made out a prima facie case of disparate impact, the showing of jobrelatedness protected the defendant from liability under Title VII.
But while the Beazer Court seemed to apply a lenient standard of
business necessity, it did not make explicit the parameters of the
defense; hence, it remains unclear whether the lower' courts will
follow this lead.
Typical of the lower court interpretations is the statement of
the rule in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp. :
[T]he applicable test is not merely whether there exists a
business purpose for adhering to a challenged practice. The test
is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient
operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be
sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose
it is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable
, E.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364-66 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Annot., 36 A.L.R. Fed. 9
(1978).
42 99 S.Ct. 1355 (1979).
Id. at 1366 n.31.
Id. (alternative ground) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
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alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish
the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well
with a lesser differential racial impact."
Other courts' formulations of the defense have been similar. In particular, courts have put stress on the word "necessity": "Necessity
connotes an irresistible demand. . . . [A practice] must not only
directly foster safety and efficiency of a plant, but also be essential
'47
to those goals.
Under these rules, however formulated, there are a number of
ways in which an employment practice that legitimately fosters a
business purpose might nonetheless fail to establish the business
necessity defense. The clearest, and most important, is the first leg
of Robinson's three-part test: the business purpose must be
"sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact."4 In practice, this establishes a balancing test: the greater its disparate impact on minorities, the greater the level of necessity required to
justify a practice as a business measure. In a substantial number of
cases, such a test will "balance away" what would otherwise be
correct, profit-maximizing business actions; indeed, where disparate impact is large, employers will be called upon to make sizable
sacrifices in the name of racial equality.4 9
A strict "necessity" requirement-often applied by the
courts-does not yield the same sliding scale of justification as the
balancing test; rather, it appears to set a floor level of business
necessity below which no disparate impact will be excused. The
courts have not settled on any more definite formulation of the
Id. at 798 (footnotes omitted). Accord, Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d
40 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Pettway v. American Cast

Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 245-47 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479
F.2d 354, 364-66 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308-09
(8th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973).
,7 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (citation
omitted). Accord, Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1295-98 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 906 (1972). See also Yale Note, supra note 6, at 99-102 (1974).
,1 444 F.2d at 798. But cf. Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972)
(including as factor in balancing test the public's interest in having adequately educated
airline pilots).
1' This can lead to anomalous results. Suppose for example, that two employers wish to
test applicants for high school level reading ability. Employer A is located in an area with a
history of inferior public education for blacks; Employer B is located in an area where the
quality of education, whether high or low, received by the two races is more equal (albeit still
unequal). If both firms show the same degree of business need for literacy, Employer B might

be permitted to use the criterion forbidden to Employer A. See Note, FairEmployment
Practices,supra note 7, at 89.
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precise level of necessity required,' but they have made it clear that
mere profit maximization is not sufficient to establish the defense.
It is not clear what is intended by the requirement that there
be no available alternative with a less differential impact. The noalternative leg of the Robinson test simply requires that there be
no more benign criterion that is as good or better for the employer's
purposes.' Such a rule does not impose any costs on employers; it
merely posits that a practice is not "necessary" when it can be replaced with another practice without loss. Other cases, however,
speak of "reasonably available alternative[s] .,"52 That formulation
suggests something closer to a balancing approach: an alternative
is unreasonable only if its cost is excessive when compared to the
improvement in racial balance it will yield.-3
The Robinson court's interpretation of the business necessity
defense has become the conventional one among lower courts, 54 although the language in which other courts have formulated the
defense has sometimes differed.5 The formulations of the lower
courts, often phrased in terms of "balancing," "strict necessity," or
"no reasonably available alternative," or combinations thereof, consistently demonstrate an extremely restrictive application of the
business necessity defense. Under any of the formulations, only the
most essential business practices will survive attack. The propriety
of so restrictively applying the business necessity defense can be
evaluated, however, only by taking a closer look at the theoretical
foundations of the defense.
50See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 365 (8th Cir. 1973)
("compelling business necessity") (citation omitted); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971) ("the only feasible or practical modus operandi"), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d
Cir. 1971) ("irresistible demand . . . essential to . . .safety and efficiency").
51 444 F.2d at 798. Accord, e.g., Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 57
(5th Cir. 1974), vacated on othergrounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); United States v. St. LouisS.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973).
52 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d at 662. Accord, Sagers v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 507, 522 (N.D. Ga. 1973); United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n of Steamfitters, 360 F. Supp. 979, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd on other grounds,
501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
" See also EEOC Dec. No. 72-0708, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 437, 438 (1971) (level of
reasonable expense an employer must incur in adopting alternatives is directly proportional
to the severity and disparity of the impact).
51E.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979); Patterson v.
American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 265 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976);
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 245 (5th Cir. 1974); Head v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973).
See Annot., 36 A.L.R. Fed. 9, 37-44 (1978).
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m.

OF Griggs AND
NECESSITY DEFENSE

THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

THE BUSINESS

There are two major theories of equality currently employed in

the interpretation of fair employment laws." The first is the concept of equal treatment-a doctrine of color-blindness under which
all persons are to be treated by employers without regard to their
race. This concept is basically an individualistic one, directed toward freeing job competitors from the handicap of racial prejudice.
The second concept-equal achievement-focuses instead on the
situation and progress of groups. Equality of treatment for individuals, according to equal-achievement theorists, is a spurious sort of
fairness because blacks remain hobbled by the disabling effects of
centuries of past discrimination; despite the illusion of fair treatment, most blacks are still relegated to a condition of economic and
social subordination. Equal achievement thus envisions a redistribution of jobs to improve the employment opportunities of blacks

as a class. 5 Either interpretation of equality-equal achievement or
equal treatment-may arguably underlie Griggs. The two interpretations, however, imply greatly different consequences for the scope
of the business necessity defense.
A.

Equal Achievement

A ready explanation of Griggs is that it is an acceptance of the
equal-achievement concept of discrimination and equality for interpreting Title VIIA Professor Blumrosen states Griggs's holding accordingly: "[D]iscrimination is conduct which has an adverse effect on minority employees as a class."5
Such an interpretation of Griggs comports with the facts and
result of the case. If equal achievement is the ultimate goal of Title
" See generally J. GARDNER,
(1961); A.

EXCELLENCE: CAN WE BE EQUAL AND EXCELLENT Too? 11-20

OKUN, EQUALrrY AND EFmcIENcY: THE BIG TmREoFF

65-87 (1975); Fiss, supra note

3, at 237-38; Nagel, Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination,2 PmOsopHy &
PuB. AsF. 348 (1973). See also Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword:In Defense
of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1976); Winter, Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through LawsAgainst Discrimination,34 U. CHm. L. REv. 817 (1967).
17 See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (opinion
of Marshall, J.); Blumrosen, supra note 9, at 66-74; Fiss, supra note 3, at 237-38, 244-49.
u It is not a minor point that Griggs was solely a Title VII decision. The case did not
purport to lay down a rule for antidiscrimination law generally. See also Blumrosen, supra
note 9, at 63. Thus, the Court has since rejected an attempt to apply Griggs's disparateimpact rule to constitutional violations. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding
that a claim under the equal protection clause, U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1, requires a
showing of discriminatory intent). See generally Brest, supra note 56, at 22-53.
1,Blumrosen, supra note 9, at 84-85. See id. at 62-63, 67-85.
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VII, then it is improper to limit liability to cases in which discriminatory intent can be proven. Even "color-blind" employment practices have the effect of continuing the economic and social subordination of minority groups whenever the practices have a harsher
impact on them than on whites., The requirements at issue in
Griggs, in fact, are textbook examples: the diploma and testing requirements, although adopted with no racial motive, had the effect
of confining blacks to the lowest-paying jobs. The appropriate standard is consequently not one of intentional discrimination, but one
of disparate impact. As Griggsholds, once a plaintiff has shown that
a hiring practice operates to exclude blacks at a higher rate than
whites, his prima facie case has been made, and it is for the employer to attempt to justify his actions through the business necessity defense. 0
The equal-achievement characterization of Griggs does not
compel any particular rule for the business necessity defense.
Viewed by itself, the goal of equal achievement is potentially limitless in terms of the duties and costs that it might impose on employers. If a business necessity defense is interposed as a limit on the
means used to pursue that goal, it is not because equal achievement
itself requires it; rather, the defense is created to protect other,
competing goals such as economic efficiency and entrepreneurial
freedom. The degree of protection that the defense provides to employers depends ultimately on the weight given to the competing
goals-a legislative value judgment." For example, if achievement
of economic equality is given a very high priority, then the business
necessity defense would legitimate only the most compelling and
unavoidable employment practices. Conversely, if efficiency and
independence of business judgment are valued more highly than
equal achievement for racial groups, almost any showing of a legitimate business purpose would provide a complete defense. A myriad
of intermediate solutions can be imagined based on different balances between the two goals. Thus, an acceptance of the equalachievement interpretation of Griggs makes the inquiry into the
proper scope of the business necessity defense turn on congressional
intent: one must determine the priority Congress sought to place on
each of the competing policies.
'' 401 U.S. at 430-32.

See generally A. OKUN, supra note 56, at 1-5 & passim.
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Equal Treatment

1. Explaining Griggs in Terms of Functional Equivalence of
Race. An alternative explanation for the Court's disparate-impact
rule in Griggs can be constructed from a theory of equality and
discrimination offered by Professor Fiss. 2 He argues that race is an
unfair and therefore objectionable employment criterion for two reasons: it is not viewed as an accurate predictor of merit and it is
beyond the individual's control." According to Fiss, "Fair employment laws reflect not only a commitment to the merit principle but
also a commitment to the principle that it is desirable to judge
individuals on the basis of criteria that are within his [sic] reach."64
Fiss argues that a "psychological approach," based solely on
the employer's subjective intent, is inadequate for identifying actionable racial discrimination." There are practical difficulties in
proving or disproving a state of mind. Moreover, such a test misses
the point of antidiscrimination provisions: the thing forbidden is the
use of a racial criterion, not the subjective reason for its use." Instead, Fiss would use a two-step inquiry not unlike the rule of
Griggs: (1) whether the criterion in fact has an adverse differential
impact on blacks; and (2) if so, whether it is unrelated to productivity and beyond individual control." If both questions are
answered in the affirmative, then, in Fiss's view, the criterion is
the functional equivalent of a racial criterion." Such a criterion
shares the same objectionable characteristics as race itself: unrelatedness to merit and lack of individual control.
2. Functional Equivalence as an Equal-Treatment Theory.
Although the functional-equivalence theory looks first to the impact
of an employment practice on a class as a whole, its true focus is
not on the results of an employment practice (as in the equalachievement theory) but on its fairness (as in the equal-treatment
theory). The reasoning is thus: if an applicant fails to meet some
,2Fiss, supra note 3.
,3Id. at 241.
" Id.
Id. at 298.
" Id. at 297-99. See also Brest, supra note 56, at 29.
' Fiss, supra note 3, at 299. Similarly, Griggs considers the plaintiff's prima facie case

made out by a showing of disparate impact, and then looks to the defendant to show a

business justification. 401 U.S. at 432. But see New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 99 S.
Ct. 1355, 1366 n.31 (1979). It is not clear, however, how Fiss meant to allocate the burden
with regard to his second inquiry-whether job-relatedness is a defense, or whether lack of
job-relatedness is part of the plaintiff's burden.
" Fiss, supra note 3, at 299.
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hiring criterion, if the reason for his failure is in some sense related
to his membership in a protected group, 9 and if the criterion serves
no legitimate purpose in the employer's business, then disqualifying the applicant on the basis of that criterion is as unfair as disqualifying him directly on the basis of his membership in the
protected group. The functional-equivalence analysis is therefore
properly characterized as an equal-treatment theory.
The logical advance Fiss makes on the traditional equaltreatment theory is that, in addition to looking at criteria that necessarily do affect any given minority applicant unfairly, he also
looks at criteria that are likely to do so. Like the equal-achievement
concept, the functional-equivalence theory of discrimination relies
heavily on statistics or similar evidence of the actual disparate impact of a hiring criterion on minority groups. This evidence, however, plays a fundamentally different role in the two theories. In
the equal-achievement analysis, impact statistics go to the heart
of the problem: disparate impact on a class level is itself the evil to
be remedied. Fiss's theory, by contrast, places the emphasis on the
fairness of a criterion as it applies to individual applicants. A showing of class statistics is relevant, not for its own sake, but because
it is generally the best available evidence of the unfairness or bias
of the criterion.
3. The Implications of Equal Treatment for the Business
Necessity Defense. This interpretation of Griggs effectively dictates its own terms for the scope of the business necessity defense.
Business necessity here is not an extraneous, competing policy
consideration, as it is under the equal-achievement theory; it is
an integral part of the functional-equivalence concept. In Fiss's
analysis, it is not unfair to use a criterion that serves a legitimate
business purpose, even though the criterion has a disproportionately harsher impact on minority members. It becomes unfair only
if that criterion is unrelated to efficiency and productivity; only in
" Fiss casts this related-to-race aspect of his theory in terms of the individual's lack of
control over, or responsibility for, his failure to meet the criterion; it is, he recognizes, essential to his conclusion that such a criterion is unfair, id. at 302-03. The primary source of racerelated incapacity, he suggests, is the lingering effect of past discrimination. For example, a
poor public education system may be responsible for blacks' poor performance on a standardized test. Id. at 303. On this point, Fiss anticipated the Griggs Court's point that the disparate
impact of Duke Power's criteria was "directly traceable to race" by way of segregated education, 401 U.S. at 430. See generally Brest, supra note 56, at 31-34. Alternatively, disparate
impact could result from simple physical factors. For example, a height requirement has a
disparate impact on women, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-31 (1977), or Chicanos,
Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 99
S. Ct. 1379 (1979).
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such a situation is the criterion as unjustified as the criterion of
race. Thus, a showing that an employment practice fosters a legitimate business purpose is virtually a complete defense to Griggs
liability, not because the value of the entrepreneurial independence
outweighs the discriminatory impact, but because such an employment practice does not constitute discrimination.
In a few special situations, however, a showing by an employer
that an employment practice is a profit-maximizing one may fail to
establish an adequate business necessity. 7 First, some employment
practices-for example, catering to the bigoted tastes of customers
or present employees-might be adopted solely as effective profitmaximizing devices; yet few would hesitate to label them as discriminatory." In addition, the functional-equivalence theory does
not rule out consideration of reasonable alternatives open to the
employer. 72 Suppose, for example, that a job requires knowledge of
a certain technical field. Two different standardized tests designed
to detect such knowledge are available, both costing the same, but
one is written in more difficult language that will penalize certain
minority groups. Viewed alone, either test seems to foster a legitimate business purpose. Nevertheless, in view of the obvious, costless alternative, the more disadvantaging test cannot be justified as
73
a business necessity.
The two alternative theoretical justifications for Title VII thus
seem to compel quite different approaches to the business necessity
defense. Acceptance of the equal-achievement interpretation of
Title VII would require a determination of the relative values Congress sought to place on the competing policies of racial equality and
business efficiency. Equal treatment, on the other hand, would require a business necessity defense that is established by most legitimate profit-maximizing practices. Since the scope of the business
necessity defense turns on the particular theory underlying Title
VII, it seems essential to conduct a closer examination of the legislative intent in enacting the statute and the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in interpreting it.
7 In some cases, a large adverse impact might be associated with so trivial a business
advantage that the challenged practice constitutes no real advantage at all. This implies that
there might be a de minimis cutoff for the defense.
i1 See text and notes at notes 37-38 supra. See also Fiss, supra note 3, at 257-63.
12 Fiss, supra note 3, at 301-02 & 301 n.73 (quoting Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing
Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and
Promotion, 82 HIAv. L. REv. 1598, 1668 (1969)).
13 This requirement has been adopted by several lower courts in their formulation of the
business necessity defense. See text and notes at notes 51-53 supra.
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CONGRESSIONAL INTENT IN ENACTING TITLE VII

A. The Legislative History
Since the business necessity defense came into existence upon
the Griggs Court's recognition of disparate-impact liability, Congress did not have occasion, in enacting Title VII, to consider the
scope and limitations of the defense. It did, however, debate the
broader issue that underlies the business necessity defense: whether
Title VII is based on an equal-treatment or an equal-achievement
concept of discrimination.7 4 The resulting legislative history consistently shows that the supporters of the bill believed that Title VII
was directed solely at unequal and unfair treatment of individuals,7 5
and that it was not expected to infringe on legitimate needs of
7
business efficiency and independence.

The strongest indication that Title VII embodies a rule of equal
treatment, rather than one of equal achievement for protected
classes, is found in the definition of discrimination offered by Senators Clark and Case, Title VII's Senate floor managers, in an interpretative memorandum: "To discriminate is to make a distinction,
to make a difference in treatment or favor. .

. ."I' The

memoran-

dum continues, emphasizing that "discrimination is prohibited as
to

. .

.individuals" and not classes.78

' See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 1518 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 1540 (remarks of
Rep. Lindsay); id. at 1600 (remarks of Rep.Minish); id. at 2557-58 (remarks of Rep. Goodell);
id. at 5092, 5094; 5423, 6549 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 6564 (remarks of Sen.
Kuchel); id. at 7207 (Justice Dept. mpmorandum introduced by Sen. Clark); id. at 7213
(memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case); id. at 12,617 (remarks of Sen. Muskie). See also
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2741-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
11See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2741-53 (Rehnquist J., dissenting);
Yale Note, supra note 6, at 103 & n.29. See generally Vaas, Title VI: Legislative History, 7
B.C. Imus. & COM. L. Rav. 431 (1966).
71See Developments in the Law-Employment Discriminationand Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. Rha. 1109, 1113-19 (1971); Yale Note, supra note 6, at 104 &
n.32, 105. But see Note, FaciallyNeutral Criteriaand DiscriminationUnder Title VII, supra
note 7, at 83.
One commentator has argued that the Court in Griggs ignored the legislative history of
Title VII, setting too strict a standard of job-relatedness, since Congress would have considered general aptitude and intelligence to be job related per se. Wilson, supra note 7, at 85258.
n 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964). Accord, id. at 1540 (remarks of Rep. Lindsay); id. at 7711
(excerpting pro-Act group's pamphlet); id. at 13,080 (remarks of Sen. Clark):
[An employer's complete freedom to choose his employees] is subject to one qualification, and that qualification is to state: "In your activity as an employer, . . . you must
not discriminate because of the color of a man's skin. You may not discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex."
That is all this provision does.
78 Id. at 7213.
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Opponents of Title VII were apparently unconvinced that its
effect would be limited to bringing about equal treatment, for they
predicted that the bill would lead to quota hiring and racial balancing by employers." Responding to these charges, supporters adamantly upheld the equal-treatment interpretation:
The language of. . . [Title VII] simply states that race is not
a qualification for employment. Every man must be judged
according to his ability. In that respect, all men are to have an
equal opportunity to be considered for a particular job ...
. . . It is possible that although a. . . particular business
will contain no Negroes, no charge of discrimination will be
made. But businesses . . . may not systematically exclude
Negroes, when the only ground for exclusion is the color of a
man's skin. 0
When it amended Title VII in 1972,81 Congress continued to
adhere to an equal-treatment concept of discrimination.8 2 Representative Dent, the bill's floor manager in the House, remarked:
"[N]o law can make men equal, but there has to be and there must
be a law to give all men and women equal treatment. ' ' " He also
observed: "True justice has to be equal. That is what we are fighting
for and what the blacks in this country are fighting for-equality of
justice, equality of opportunity. They do not want special treatment
. . . because special treatment itself breeds a sort of discrimination
that you cannot tolerate.""
Is E.g., id. at 1620 (remarks of Rep. Abernethy); id. at 6011, 8500 (remarks of Sen.
Smathers); id. at 7422 (remarks of Sen. Robertson); id. at 8447 (remarks of Sen. Hill).
"Id. at 8921 (remarks of Sen. Williams). Accord, id. at 1994 (remarks of Rep. Healey);
id. at 9881 (remarks of Sen. Allott); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1963),
reprinted in EEOC, LaisLATrv HISTORY OF TrI.s VII AND XI OF Crvm RIHTS Acr OF 1964,

at 2150 (1968). See also Yale Note, supra note 6, at 106.
M Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976)). See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment OpportunityAct of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972).
91The Section-by-Section Analysis of the 1972 amendments, submitted to each House
by the Chairmen of the Conference Committee, implicitly approved Griggs (decided in 1971)
by stating that existing court interpretations of Title VII continued to govern areas not
covered by the amendments. 118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7563 (1972).
117 CONG. Rac. 32,089 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Dent).
Id. at 31,979 (remarks of Rep. Dent). Senator Ervin introduced two amendments
expressly to prohibit government compulsion of quotas under Title VII or Exec. Order No.
11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation). 118 CONG. Rac. 1662-64, 4917-18 (1972). The
defeat of these amendments, however, does not indicate any intention to expand the scope
of, or alter the conceptual rationale for, liability under Title VII; rather, the Senate's apparent
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Proponents of Title VII also had to allay fears that the bill
would be an intolerable encroachment on free enterprise.8 5 They
repeatedly and consistently assured their colleagues that Title VII
was only designed to deny employers the right to make employment
decisions based on prohibited criteria, and that practices related to
efficiency and productivity would not be restricted. An interpretative memorandum by Senator Case explained:
Whatever its merit as a socially desirable objective, title
VII would not require, and no court could read title VII as
requiring, an employer to lower or change the occupational
qualifications he sets for his employees simply because proportionately fewer Negroes than whites are able to meet
them. . . . [Nor would it require lower standards] because
prior cultural or educational deprivation of Negroes prevented
them from qualifying ...
Title VII says merely that a covered employer cannot refuse to hire someone simply because of his color. It expressly
protects the employer's right to insist that any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicable job qualifications. Indeed, the very purpose of title VII is to promote
hiring on the basis of job qualifications, rather than on the
86
basis of race or color.
In the face of such direct statements, the only possible way to
reconcile the rule of Griggs with the clear message of the legislative
history is to conclude that Griggs cannot require any employer to
"lower or change" his standards solely on account of their disparate
impact on a protected group; a showing that those standards serve
a legitimate business purpose must be a complete defense to a
charge of disparate-impact discrimination.
concern was with maintenance of the courts' ability to devise proper remedies once liability
was found. See id. at 1664-65, 4918 (remarks of Sens. Javits and Williams).
Especially troubling to the Congressmen was the decision of the Illinois Fair Employment Commission in Myart v. Motorola, Inc., Charge No. 63C-127 (1964), reprinted in 110
CONG. REC. 562-64 (1964), rev'd sub noma. Motorola, Inc. v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 34 Ill. 2d 266, 215 N.E.2d 286 (1966), suggesting that no standardized test on
which whites performed better than blacks could ever be used, even if justified by business
necessity. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 n.10. Title VII's sponsors repeatedly disclaimed any such interpretation of the Act. E.g., 110 CONG. REc. 7246-47 (1964)
(memorandum of Sen. Case).
"' 110 CONG. REc. 7246-47 (1964). Accord, id. at 1518 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 7213
(memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case); id. at 13,079-80 (remarks of Sen. Clark); id. at
13,088 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 13,825 (exchange of Sens. Case and McClellan).
These statements of congressional intent were relied on heavily by the GriggsCourt. 401 U.S.
at 434 & n.11.
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Griggs's Interpretation of Legislative Intent

The Griggs Court did not explicitly adopt any particular concept of discrimination and equality. Nevertheless, the language and
reasoning of its opinion reveal that the Court's chief concern in
interpreting and applying Title VII, consistent with the legislative
materials just discussed, was not with achieving equal results for
black and white employment, but with ensuring that employment
opportunities be equally open to all applicants, free of arbitrary
racial or race-related barriers. 7 "Discriminatory preference for any
group, minority or majority," the Court said, "is precisely and only
what Congress has proscribed." 88
The Griggs Court seemed to apply a form of the functionalequivalence analysis when it discussed the relation between the
disparate impact of Duke Power's employment criteria and the
plaintiffs' race. It pointed out that the poorer performance of blacks
on Duke Power's tests was "directly traceable to race," 89 resulting
from low-quality segregated education. The Court noted that in an
earlier case, "because of the inferior education received by Negroes
in North Carolina, [it had] barred the institution of a literacy test
for voter registration on the ground that the test would abridge the
right to vote indirectly on account of race. 9 0 .Likewise, the Griggs
Court apparently treated Duke Power's tests as unintentional surrogates for a direct racial criterion 9 -an approach consonant with
2
Professor Fiss's functional-equivalence concept.
The Court's discussion of the business necessity defense also
leaves no implication that something more than a showing of a
legitimate business purpose is required to avoid liability. 3 The
17 But see Note, FaciallyNeutral Criteriaand DiscriminationUnder Title VII, supra note
7, at 105.
401 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).
,Id. at 430.
, Id. (emphasis added) (citing Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969)).
"
The Court said that Title VII prohibits "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary"
criteria that "operate invidiously to discriminate." 401 U.S. at 431. It likened such criteria
to Aesop's fable in which a fox invited a stork to dine and served the meal in a low, flat dish.
The unfairness in this is manifest: although both animals were served the same food in the
same dish, the stork was in fact not served. The Court said that Congress has required
"that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one all seekers can use." Id. See also
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 308 n.44 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (dictum): "[The presumption in Griggs. . . was based on legislative determinations. . . that
past discrimination had handicapped various minority groups to such an extent that disparate impact could be traced to identifiable instances of past discrimination ..
92 See text and notes at notes 62-68 supra.
"3Cf. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (legitimate business purpose
rebuts prima facie showing of "disparate treatment" discrimination under McDonnell Doug-
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Court stressed that Congress intended to make job qualifications
"the controlling factor" in employment considerations and to make
"race, religion, nationality, and sex . . . irrelevant." 4 Tests that
reasonably measure job performance are permitted even if they have
a disparate impact, since they advance this goal. "5
C.

The Subsequent Supreme Court Interpretations

The Court has never explicitly stated what general rationale
underlies its decision in Griggs. Yet in subsequent Title VII cases,
the Court has consistently held that Title VII only requires an employer to accord equal treatment to individuals. In a recent case,
however, the Court held that Title VII does not forbid employers to
adopt voluntarily a plan that gives a preference to bla'ks as a class. "
The Court's most direct. treatment of the individual/class
equality issue is found in City of Los Angeles v. Manhart7 The case

involved a class action challenging the pension plan of the city's
Department of Water and Power. The plan required female employees to make larger contributions than male employees. The basis for
the differential was the unchallenged actuarial fact that the female
employees, on the average, would live a few years longer than the
males; since monthly pension payments were the same for each sex,
the cost of a pension was greater for female retirees than for male
retirees." Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, framed the resultant issue squarely: "The question

. .

is whether the existence or

nonexistence of 'discrimination' is to be determined by comparison
99
of class characteristics or individual characteristics.) 9
Justice Stevens found no room for doubt in the language of
Title VII: in unambiguous terms it prohibits discrimination
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (employer
not required by Title VII's religious discrimination provision, section 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976), to incur more than "de minimis cost" to accommodate employee's
religious needs).
" 401 U.S. at 436.
,Id. For support, the Court quoted an interpretative memorandum by Senator Case,
a floor manager of Title VII: "Title VII 'expressly protects the employer's right to insist that
any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicablejob qualifications.
Indeed, the very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of qualifications, rather
than on the basis of race or color.' " 401 U.S. at 434 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 7247 (1964))
(emphasis added by the Court). The Court mistakenly ascribed co-authorship of the memorandum to Senator Clark.
," United Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979); see text and notes at notes 108115 infra.
17435 U.S. 702 (1978).
" Id. at 704-05.
Id. at 708.
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"'against any individual . . . because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.' "100 Hence, even an accurate
generalization cannot be used against individuals whom it does not
fit; they must be treated as individuals, not as class members. Justice Stevens went on to state that the "basic policy" of Title VII is
"fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes."' 01
1
In InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,02
the Court again interpreted Title VII as protecting individuals and
not classes. The district court, after finding that the employer's
seniority system unlawfully prevented the plaintiff class from transferring to more desirable positions within the company, ordered that
the injured plaintiffs receive priority in job placement and retroactive seniority. °3 The court of appeals adjusted the district court's
remedy but still extended relief to all minority employees. 4 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the only employees entitled
to relief were those who could show that they had applied for a
transfer or would have applied but for the company's seniority system. Title VII, the Court held, protects only individual victims of
discrimination and not all of the company's minority employees as
a class. 05
There is also dictum in Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke'° supporting this interpretation of Title VII. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist, stated that Congress believed Title VII embodied "the
IN Id. at 708 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976)) (emphasis added by the Court).

M 435 U.S. at 709. Although only three Justices (Stewart, White, and Powell) joined in
all of Justice Stevens's opinion, it is apparent that at least seven of the eight participating

Justices agreed with Justice Stevens that Title VII is directed toward fairness to individuals
rather than classes. Justice Marshall joined in the relevant part of the Court's opinion,
dissenting only from the holding on relief, id. at 728-33. Chief Justice Burger and Justice

Rehnquist, by contrast, concurred on the relief point but dissented as to Title VII liability,
id. at 725-28. Although they agreed that Title VII mandates fair treatment as between individuals, id. at 727-28 (by implication), they concluded that the Department of Water and

Power had done as much as possible. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, but
expressed doubts as to the liability holding, id. at 723-25; his attitude toward the larger
issue does not emerge. Justice Brennan did not participate.
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
" United States v. T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 690 (N.D. Tex. 1972),
modified, 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
1'' 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
IN 431 U.S. at 362-71.
'" 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
''
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principle of individual equality."'' 7
The only case that casts some doubt on this interpretation of
Title VII is United Steelworkers v. Weber. 10 There the Court held
that the Kaiser Aluminum Company's affirmative action plan was
permissible under Title VII. Although the Court found a raceconscious employment practice legal and emphasized Congress's
desire, in enacting Title VII, to improve the position of blacks as a
class,109 it strictly limited its holding to plans that are voluntarily
and privately operated. The Court did not address what "Title VII
requires or. . .what a court might order. . .[but only] whether
Title VII forbids private employers and unions from voluntarily
1 10
agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans."
SThe narrowness of the Court's holding in Webe- is highlighted
by its approving reference to McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co."' In that case, two white employees were dismissed after
being charged with misappropriating a shipper's goods. A black
employee, charged in the same alleged theft, was retained. The
whites sued, alleging a discriminatory discharge in violation of Title
VII and section 1981 of Title 42.112 The Court unanimously' 3 held
that Title VII bars racial discrimination against whites as well as
4
against blacks and other members of disadvantaged racial groups.1
The Weber Court distinguished McDonald on the basis that Weber
'0 Id. at 416 n.19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis in
original).
1- 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
109
The Weber majority purported to rest this conclusion on several quotations taken from
Senate debates on Title VII. See id. at 2727-28. Most of the quoted passages, however, lend
themselves as easily to an equal-treatment interpretation of Title VII as to an equalachievement theory. Senator Humphrey, for example, is quoted as making the following
point: "'How can a Negro child be motivated to take full advantage of integrated educational
facilities if he has no hope of getting a job where he can use that education?' " Id. at 2727
(quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6547 (1964)). It does not follow, however, from Senator Humphrey's
statement that minorities should be assured good jobs; it may simply mean that minorities
should not be shut out of jobs on account of race. See 110 CONG. REc. 5423, 6549, 6553, 11,848
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (supporting equal-treatment interpretation of Title VII,
and stating that the Title prohibits minority preference). Justice Rehnquist, dissenting,
analyzed the legislative history and concluded that the majority's construction of Title VII
was a misinterpretation of congressional intent of Orwellian dimensions. 99 S. Ct. at 273637, 2747-52. This view was also shared by Chief Justice Burger, id. at 2736 (Burger, C.J.,
joining Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and by Justice Blackmun, id. at 2730-31, 2732 (Blackmun,
J., concurring). Hence since Justices Powell and Stevens did not participate in the decision,
the majority's view of the legislative history was shared by only four Justices.
"10 99 S.Ct. at 2726 (emphasis in original).
"1 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
12 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
2
Justices White and Rehnquist dissented in part on other grounds.
' 427 U.S. at 278-80.
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involved an affirmative action plan while McDonaldinvolved plain
racial discrimination.11 5 Weber thus seems to leave undisturbed
those cases holding that Title VII requires employers to provide
equal treatment regardless of race.
V.

THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE

The theoretical underpinnings of the business necessity defense, the legislative history of Title VII, and the Supreme Court's
interpretations of that history all suggest that business necessity
means nothing more than legitimate business purpose. The higher
standard of business necessity adopted by the lower courts1 ' is fundamentally inconsistent with the equal-treatment rationale of the
Act.
The lower courts have relied on a textual distinction between
"business purpose" and "business necessity"; many of these courts
have concluded that, by using the term "necessity," the Griggs
Court erected a standard higher than mere business purpose."' Such
an interpretation of Griggs places unwarranted reliance on a single
phrase in the opinion. The Court made several references to the
defense, using (apparently interchangeably) the phrases "business
necessity,""' "genuine business need,""' "manifest relationship to
the employment,' 2 "demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs,' 21 "reasonable measure of job perform24
ance," 122 "related to job performance,"1 2 and "job related.'
Plainly, the Court did not intend to give any special meaning to the
word "necessity." Reading special significance into the term
"necessity" does not comport with the clear tenor of the opinion.
The Griggs Court, indeed, never stated that Title VII would
forbid an employer from using the objectively best available criteria
"299 S.Ct. at 2726-27 (citing McDonald, 427 U.S. at 281 n.8).
"' See text and notes at notes 6-7, 41, 45-55 supra.
,7See, e.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975) (business
necessity "'connotes an irresistible demand'"); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446
F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (same). But see Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376
(9th Cir. 1979), where the court quoted dictum in a footnote in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977), to reach its conclusion that an "'employment practice must be
shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance.'"
,,5
401 U.S. at 431.
2

Id. at 432.

120Id.

2 Id. at 431.
12 Id. at 436.
12

Id. at 431.

224

Id. at 436.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[46:911

for predicting job performance. On the contrary, the Court strongly
suggested that employers must use precisely those standards:
"Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred
over the better qualified simply because of minority origins. Far
from disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such
qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant.' ' 15 The holding in Griggs simply
prevents employers from using uneconomic criteria-criteria unrelated to job performance-that decrease minority opportunities.
A better explanation for the Court's reference to "necessity"
rather than "purpose" emerges if one considers the term in the
context of the holding of Griggs that race-correlative employment
criteria must be shown to-be.job related. The term serves to make
it clear that the standard of job-relatedness is an objective one. If
an employer believes that his employment practices serve his business needs, his purpose in applying them is a "business purpose,"
whether or not his belief is factually correct. But only if the practice
in fact serves business purposes can it be deemed "necessary" to the
firm's efficient operation.
CONCLUSION

Griggs v. Duke Power Co. has been called "the most important
court decision in employment discrimination law."1 26 As a seminal
case, it has given rise to numerous lower court opinions interpreting
and applying its holding. But with respect to the scope of the business necessity defense, the lower courts have departed from the
teachings of Griggs and the legislative history of Title VII-a departure attributable to a failure to appreciate the theory underlying
disparate-impact liability. An examination of this theory shows that
the Griggs theory of Title VII is properly explained by Professor
Fiss's "functional equivalence" approach to racial discrimination,
and that this approach implies a far more generous standard of
business necessity than the lower courts have allowed.
Marcus B. Chandler
IId.

,' B. SCHLE1 & P. GROSSmAN, supra note 3, at 5 (footnote omitted).

